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Workers' Compensation
by H. Michael Bagley*
Daniel C. Kniffen'
John G. Blackmon, Jr.'**
and
Phillip Comer Griffeth*...

I.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps the most interesting developments this survey period came
from the many opportunities the Georgia Supreme Court had to tackle
difficult issues in the workers' compensation arena, especially when the
court rarely hears workers' compensation appeals. From what some
would call drastic developments in the claimant's burden of proof in
change in condition cases, to an examination of Georgia's long-standing
requirement of a "physical injury" in psychological claims, the court was
faced with some interesting legal arguments. Although these opinions
may not require legislative intervention or clarification, the Chairman
of the State Board's advisory committee will no doubt continue to fine
tune certain aspects of the Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act"),' as
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the committee has done in previous survey periods. In the end, final
word on some of these somewhat controversial issues (e.g., the compensability of mental-mental psychological claims) may come through the
Georgia General Assembly.
IL

ATTACK ON THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY DOCTRINE

Judicially recognized exceptions to the exclusive remedy doctrine have
been developed to deal rationally and consistently with matters clearly
outside of the workers' compensation system, or to draw a distinct line
for circumstances lying on the periphery.2 Unlike the exceptions
traditionally recognized by Georgia courts, an exception involving the
delivery of medical care would affect the most fundamental working part
of the workers' compensation system. Statistics published by the State
Board of Workers' Compensation ("Board") show that more than fiftyseven percent of all funds flowing through the system were for medical
care in 1994. a More importantly, while virtually every claim involved
medical care, less than twenty-four percent of claims also resulted in the
payment of disability benefits.4 Therefore, the implications of creating
a new exception to the exclusive remedy doctrine for alleged delays in
providing medical care are profound because there is a high probability
that a new exception will result in an increase in litigation unprecedented in Georgia history. Practically every workers' compensation claim
could generate a civil action. In fact, every workers' compensation claim
could generate multiple civil actions for each alleged delay in medical
care.

At the heart of this controversy is the court of appeals decision in
Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Dicks.' June Dicks sustained a workrelated injury and was provided medical care by an authorized physician
who certified that Ms. Dicks was totally disabled. The workers'
compensation insurer arranged for an independent medical evaluation
by another physician. After this physician opined that Ms. Dicks was
not disabled, the employer not only suspended payment of disability

2. See H. Michael Bagley, Daniel C. Kniffen, & John G. Blackmon, Jr., Workers'
Compensation, 45 MERCER L. REV. 493, 495-98 (1993).
3. 1995 GA. STATE BD. OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION ANN. REP. 52. Five hundred
twenty-one indemnity cases were reported with a date of injury in calendar year 1994.
$172,304,909 in medical dollars were paid on lost time cases as of December 31, 1995.
Another 166,356 cases were reported as medical-only claims. $45,683,902 were paid on

medical-only cases. $384,292,131 were paid out on all cases (lost time and medical-only
cases) as of December 31, 1995.
4. Id.
5. 220 Ga. App. 725, 470 S.E.2d 279, overruled by Doss v. Food Lion, Inc., 267 Ga. 312,
477 S.E.2d 577 (1996).
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benefits, but also suspended the physical therapy that had previously
been ordered by Ms. Dicks's authorized physician. The Administrative
Law Judge ("AIX) ordered all benefits restored and also awarded
attorney fees to Ms. Dicks. However, Ms. Dicks then brought a civil
action against the workers' compensation insurer alleging that her
condition had been aggravated by the delay in receiving medical care.6
In a six-to-three decision written by Chief Judge Dorothy Beasley, the
whole court found that the exclusive remedy doctrine does not bar a civil
suit alleging physical injuries from intentional delays in providing
medical care for a work-related injury.' The decision was based upon
the erroneous conclusion that, "[tlo hold otherwise would leave Dicks and
others similarly situated without legal remedy."8 This is a novel and
heretofore unseen interpretation of the law in Georgia.
Although the court of appeals did not directly decide this issue in Jim
Walter Homes, Inc. v. Roberts,9 the court in Dicks relied upon certain
dicta in the Jim Walter Homes opinion.1" The key factor in the Jim
Walter Homes decision was that it was a default case which created a
factual scenario that would not normally exist-the employer could not
challenge the allegation that the handling of medical care was outside
the purview of the Act.11
Contrary to the court of appeals' reasoning in Dicks and Jim Walter
Homes, the Act does provide remedies for intentional delay of medical
treatment. Not only can the Board "appoint one or more" physicians to
"make any necessary medical examination,"12 or order a complete
change of physician or treatment,13 but the Board can also assess
attorney fees when authorized medical care is impeded "in whole or in
part without reasonable grounds." 4 The Board is also empowered to
assess a penalty of up to twenty percent of the amount of any medical
expense that is not paid within sixty days, 5 and may also assess a civil
6. 220 Ga. App. at 726, 470 S.E.2d at 280.
7. Id. at 728, 470 S.E.2d at 281-82.

8. Id.
9. 196 Ga. App. 618, 396 S.E.2d 787 (1990).
10. 220 Ga. App. at 728, 470 S.E.2d at 281.
11. Id.
12. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-101 (1992).
13. Id. § 34-9-201(e) (Supp. 1996).
14. Id. § 34-9-108(b)(1) (1992).
15. Id. § 34-9-203 has been modified to empower the Board with authority to impose
penalties for late payment of reasonable medical charges, but only in specific circumstances. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-203(c) (Supp. 1996) reads as follows:
The board may, in its discretion, assess a penalty of up to 20 percent of reasonable
medical charges not paid within 60 days from the date that the employer or the
employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier receives the charges and
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penalty of up to ten thousand dollars per violation for intentionally
making any representation for the purpose of "the obtaining or denying
of any benefit" under the Act."6 Furthermore, specifically addressing
the issue of damages for an employee's potentially enhanced physical
problems, to the extent that any delay in medical care prolongs the
employee's period of disability, payment of temporary total disability
benefits would be extended correspondingly. 7 Additionally, greater
recovery of permanent partial disability benefits could also result from
an increase in the employee's permanent physical impairment caused by
the delay.18 Finally, in contemplation of the most egregious intentional
act by an employer, Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.")
section 34-9-265(e) enhances death benefits by twenty percent for
dependents of any deceased employee whose death "was the direct result
of an injury proximately caused by the intentional act of the employer
with specific intent to cause such injury."'"
Although the Georgia Supreme Court could not hear the Dicks case
due to that case's procedural posture, the court ultimately decided a
similar question certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the.
Eleventh Circuit:
Does Georgia law recognize an independent cause of action apart from
any remedy under the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act where an
employer and/or insurer has intentionally delayed authorizing medical
treatment to which an employee is entitled under the Act and where
such delay has exacerbated a work-related physical injury? 0
The court unanimously found that an independent cause of action in
tort for the intentional delay of medical treatment in a workers'

reports required by the board where there has been compliance with the
requirements of law and board rules. Said penalty shall be payable to the medical
provider.
16. Id. § 34-9-18(b) (Supp. 1996).
17. Id. § 34-9-261. See, e.g., K-Mart Apparel Corp. v. Temples, 260 Ga. 871,401 S.E.2d
5 (1991) (employer responsible for medical treatment following medical malpractice if
malpractice resulted from treatment for the on-the-job injury; the consequences of
malpractice are compensable in the form of resulting medical expenses and indemnity
benefits).
18. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-263 (Supp. 1996). See, e.g., Davis v. General Motors Corp., 166 Ga.
App. 401,304 S.E.2d 402 (1983) (award of permanent partial disability benefits based upon
allegation that claimant's disability had increased from 10% to 50%was supported by the
evidence); Davis v. Cobb County, 106 Ga. App. 336, 126 S.E.2d 710 (1962) (an award is

subject to change upon request for hearing based on a change of condition).
19. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-265(e) (Supp. 1996). Furthermore, the exclusive remedy doctrine
is reinforced in that provision by specific reference to O.C.G.A § 34-9-11 (Supp. 1996).
20. Doss v. Food Lion, Inc., 83 F.3d 378, 380 (11th Cir. 1996). See Doss v. Food Lion,
Inc., 267 Ga. at 312, 477 S.E.2d at 577 (1996).
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compensation claim is "inconsistent with the public policy behind the
statutory scheme," thereby barring the viability of any tort action on
that theory.21 The court specifically reversed Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Dicks,22 in which the court of appeals reached a contrary
conclusion, alluded to its previous decision in Bright u. Nimmo,M which
denied an independent action for the intentional delay of disability
payments, 24 and specifically addressed the issue of public policy,
pointing out that the exclusive remedy provision is "the bedrock of the
workers' compensation system" since it is the "quidpro quo for workers
receiving a guaranty of prompt benefits for work-related injuries without
regard to fault or common law defenses and without the delay inherent
in tort litigation."25 The court further articulated the reality that
workers' compensation "has never been intended to make the employee
whole-it excludes benefits for pain and suffering, for loss of consortium,
and it provides a cap on wage benefits." 6 In the final analysis, the
court reaffirmed that any exception to the exclusive remedy doctrine
"must originate with the Legislature."2 7 With the Georgia Supreme
Court's unequivocal decision in Doss, the exclusive remedy doctrine has
withstood yet another attack.
Other developments this survey period show that the exclusive remedy
doctrine is not always all encompassing. For example, in Coleman v.
Columns Properties, Inc.,2 the employee was injured in a fall and
brought a premises liability suit. A prior workers' compensation claim
had been denied because the employee failed to prove that her accident
"arose out of and in the course of her employment." 2 The Georgia
Supreme Court held that because the workers' compensation decision

21. Doss v. Food Lion, Inc., 267 Ga. 312, 477 S.E.2d 577 (1996).
22. 220 Ga. App. 725, 470 S.E.2d 279 (1996).
23. 253 Ga. 378, 320 S.E.2d 365 (1984).
24. 267 Ga. at 312-13, 477 S.E.2d at 578.
where an employee's initial injury is made worse by the employer's intentional
delay in authorizing treatment, the Act provides for penalties to punish the
employer's conduct and permits the employee to seek benefits for the exacerbated
injury. Because the Act provides penalties and allows for additional compensation, there is no logical reason for distinguishing intentional delay in payments
from an intentional delay in authorizing treatment: Therefore, we reach the same
conclusion as reached in Bright and hold that no independent cause of action

arises from the intentional delay in authorizing treatment.
Id.
25. Id. at 313, 477 S.E.2d at 578.
26. Id.
27.

Id.

28. 266 Ga. 310, 467 S.E.2d 328 (1996).
29. Id. at 310, 467 S.E.2d at 329.
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was not a binding determination on the employee's status as a noninvitee, the property owner's motion for summary judgment was properly
denied.3" Also, actions by children of injured employees are not
derivative of any work-related claim of the parent-employees and
therefore will not be subject to the exclusive remedy rule.3" In Hitachi
Chemical Electro-Products, Inc. v. Gurley, the court held that the
employer's motion to dismiss was properly denied in an action by
employees and their children alleging injuries to the children for
negligent exposure of the parent-employees to hazardous chemicals. 2
During this survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court also reversed
a decision from the court of appeals and held that the exclusive remedy
doctrine prevents a co-employee from being brought into an employee's
action against a third party.33 In Weller v. Brown,34 the plaintiff was
rear-ended while on the way to an employer-sponsored seminar. A coemployee was riding with the defendant to the seminar. After being
sued, the defendant brought the co-employee into the suit by impleader. 5 The court of appeals allowed the third-party complaint, even
though the defendant and co-employee had received workers' compensation benefits.3" However, the supreme court held that the exclusive
remedy doctrine precludes a defendant in a personal injury action from
asserting a third-party contribution claim against a co-worker of the
injured employee.37
III. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
the
Once again, the 1996 Legislative Session saw a bill drafted 3by
8
Board's Legislative Subcommittee, House Bill 1291, become law.
Heart Attacks and Strokes
A recent decision handed down by the court of appeals, Reynolds
Construction Co. v. Reynolds, 9 was legislatively corrected. It was the
first case in which uncontradicted medical testimony did not prevail over

A.

30.

Id. at 312, 467 S.E.2d at 330.

31. See Hitachi Chemical Electro-Products, Inc. v. Gurley, 219 Ga. App. 675,466 S.E.2d
867 (1995).
32, Id. at 678, 466 S.E.2d at 869.
33. Weller v. Brown, 266 Ga. 130, 464 S.E.2d 805 (1996).
34. 266 Ga. 130, 464 S.E.2d 805 (1996).
35. Id. at 130, 464 S.E.2d at 805.
36. Id. at 131, 464 S.E.2d at 806.
37. Id.
38. 1996 Ga. Laws 1291.
39. 218 Ga. App. 23, 459 S.E.2d 612 (1995). See also infra notes 184-94 and
accompanying text.
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lay testimony and the "natural inference through human experience.""°
The definition of "injury" in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-1 was modified to
include victims of stroke and to require, as a precondition to recovery,
evidence from a physician that the condition is "related to the work of
employment at the time the condition occurred."4 '
Independent ContractorDefined
Consistency in determining "independent contractor" status has been
very difficult in Georgia's workers' compensation system for decades.
Under the 1996 legislation, a new subsection (e) of O.C.G.A. section 34-92 was added to define independent contractors using the following
criteria: (1) whether the person "[i]s a party to a contract, written or
implied, which intends to create an independent contractor relationship;"
(2) whether the alleged employer "[hias the right to exercise control over
the time, manner, and method of the work to be performed;" and (3)
whether the alleged employee "[is paid on a set price per job or a per
unit basis."4 2 If all criteria are met, an independent contractor
relationship is created "unless otherwise determined by an Administrative Law Judge."4 3

B.

Limited Liability Corporations
Corporate officers have long been able to opt out of workers' compensation coverage under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-2.1. 44 The 1996 legislation
specifies that limited liability companies are to be treated in the same
manner.45 The new amendments also clarify that any employer subject
to the Act before the filing of corporate exemptions shall remain subject
to the Act without regard to the number of exemptions filed, unless all
employees are exempted. 46
C.

D. Safety Rules
Despite the fact that O.C.G.A. section 34-9-17(a) contains a defense for
the violation of any safety rule approved by the Board,47 the Board has

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 25-26, 459 S.E.2d at 614.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (Supp. 1996).
Id. § 34-9-2(e)(l)-(3).
Id. § 34-9-2.

44. Id. § 34-9-2.1(a) (1992).
45.

Id. § 34-9-2.1(a) (Supp. 1996).

46. Id. § 34-9-2.1(aX3).
47. Id. § 34-9-17(a) (1992). No compensation is allowed for injury or death due to an
employee's wilful misconduct or for violation of a rule or regulation adopted by an employer
and approved by the Board. Id.

590

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

never had the resources to fulfill this requirement and has never
approved a safety rule. Therefore, this provision was deleted while all
other defenses have been retained, including the wilful failure to use
safety appliances. 4
Payment of Penaltiesand Fines
The requirement that all penalties and costs be "made payable to the
State of Georgia" was refined to require that payments be "made payable
to the State Board of Workers' Compensation." 9

E.

Certificationof Voluntary RehabilitationSuppliers

F

Rehabilitation in noncatastrophic cases will remain voluntary, but in
those cases, the parties electing to provide a rehabilitation supplier must
utilize a supplier that holds one of the certifications or licenses specified
in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-200.1(f) and be registered with the Board.5 °
The Board may also, in its discretion, issue special exceptions on a case
by case basis.51
G. Guardianship
For decades, the Board has possessed the power to appoint guardians
solely for the purpose of workers' compensation under O.C.G.A. section
34-9-226.52 However, no procedural safeguards existed to ensure the
competency or performance of any of the guardians.5" Such safeguards
are already provided in the procedures for guardianship through the
probate court.5" Section 34-9-226 was modified to remove the authority
from the Board to appoint guardians for the purpose of workers'
compensation and require guardians duly appointed and qualified by the
county of residence of such minor or legally
probate court of the
55
incompetent person.
Coordinationof Unemployment Compensation Payments
In addition to funding workers' compensation coverage, employers are
legally required to fund unemployment insurance.5 6 When both
H.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. § 34-9-17(a) (Supp. 1996).
Id. § 34-9-18(f).
Id. § 34-9-200.1(0.
Id. § 34-9-200.1(h).
Id. § 34-9-226 (1992).
See id. § 29-5-1(b) (1993).
See id.
Id. § 34-9-226 (Supp. 1996).
Id. § 34-8-150(a) (1992).
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benefits are collected simultaneously by an employee, the right to
reimbursement has been vested in the Employment Security Administration.57 That agency was not well suited to monitor such overpayments.
Therefore, section 34-9-243 was modified to allow the employer to take
credit for any benefit paid under the Employment Security Law.'
Temporary Total DisabilityBenefits

L

The maximum amount of temporary total disability benefits was
increased from $275 to $300 per week. 9 There was no corresponding
increase in the amount of temporary partial disability benefits under
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-262, and the maximum there will remain
$192.50.60
J.

Impairment Ratings

The requirement that impairment ratings follow the "Guides to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment" published by the American
Medical Association ("AMA") has been in effect for a number of years. 1
As a housekeeping measure, that requirement was moved from section
34-9-1 and placed within section 34-9-263, which deals specifically with
permanent partial disability.6 2 Further clarifying which edition must
be used, the Act now specifies that the fourth edition of the AMA Guide
is controlling.6 " The provisions related to establishing ratings for
phalanges, amputated extremities, and disability to the body as a whole
under section 34-9-263(d), (e), and (f) were all deleted." Therefore, the
AMA Guide, fourth edition, now provides the sole method for determining permanent partial disability.65
Hazardous Occupations and OccupationalDiseases

K

For decades, section 34-9-290 has contained the requirement that the
Board report to the Department of Human Resources all occupations
found to be hazardous, and all cases of occupational disease, on forms
supplied to the Board by the Department of Human Resources. 6 This

57. Id. § 34-8-81.
58. Id. § 34-9-243(a) (Supp. 1996).
59. Id. § 34-9-261.
60, Id. § 34-9-262.
61. Id. § 34-9-1(5) (1992).
62. Id. § 34-9-263 (Supp. 1996),
63. Id.

64, Id.
65.
66.

Id.
Id. § 34-9-290 (1992).
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provision was never funded, and the Board never possessed the resources
to comply with this provision. Therefore, as a housekeeping measure,
this requirement was deleted."7
L. Attorney Fees Against the Subsequent Injury Trust Fund
In Georgia Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Muscogee Iron Works,"
the supreme court held that attorney fees of an employer or insurer were
not recoverable from the Georgia Subsequent Injury Trust Fund ("SITF")
because none of the statutory provisions of O.C.G.A. sections 34-9-350
through 34-9-367 expressly authorized the recovery of attorney fees. 9
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-367 was modified to allow the assessment of
attorney fees in those situations where it is proven by a preponderance
of the evidence that the SITF has unreasonably failed or refused to
accept, in whole or in part, a valid claim for reimbursement by an
employer or insurer as provided for under the Act.70
IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES
During the last survey period, the writers suggested that the Georgia
Supreme Court's opinion in Southwire Co. v. George71 "should be
interesting in light of the fact that the chief justice is already on record
as opposed to the long-standing physical injury requirement for claims
of psychiatric disability."72 Although the Chief Justice continued his
opposition by joining in a lengthy special concurrence written by Justice
Sears, 73 the supreme court made clear that the physical injury requirement, which was well established in Georgia law, is still intact.7 4
Much of the controversy surrounding this case came from the
suggestion by the court of appeals that "although [the claimant's]
physical injury [wals not the cause of his mental disability, it [wals part
of the reason for its continuation." 75 In affirming the court of appeals,
the supreme court held that a claimant is entitled to benefits for mental
disability and psychic treatment which, while not necessarily precipitated by a physical injury, arose out of an accident in which a compensable

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. § 34-9-290 (Supp. 1996).
265 Ga. 790, 462 S.E.2d 367 (1995).
Id. at 791, 462 S.E.2d at 368.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-367 (Supp. 1996).
266 Ga. 739, 470 S.E.2d 865 (1996).
H. Michael Bagley, Daniel C. Kniffen, John G. Blackmon, Jr. & Phillip Comer

Griffeth, Workers' Compensation, 47 MERCER L. REV. 405, 423 (1995).

73. 266 Ga. at 743, 470 S.E.2d at 867 (Sears, J., concurring specially).
74. Id. at 741, 470 S.E.2d at 866-67.
75. 217 Ga. App. at 588, 458 S.E.2d at 363.
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physical injury was sustained, when that injury contributes to the
continuation of the psychic trauma.76 The physical injury need not be
the precipitating cause of the psychic trauma; the injury is compensable
if the physical injury contributes to the continuation of the psychic
trauma.7 7 In concluding that the claimant should be compensated for
psychic trauma precipitated by psychic stimuli, the supreme court held,
the court of appeals substituted itself as a fact-finding body.78 The
court remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration in light of the
clarified standard for the mental disability claim.79
V.

CASE LAw DEVELOPMENTS

Accident Arising Out of Employment
In Lewis v. Chatham County Savannah Metropolitan Planning
Commission, ° the claimant had permission to use the employer's
vehicle for the combined purpose of doing personal banking, running an
errand for the employer, and performing bank activities for the
employer. Prior to completing her employer's banking, the claimant
deviated from the errand route to have lunch, but then turned back
toward the bank to conduct her employer's business. A collision occurred
on the way to the bank. The Board held that the accident arose out of
and in the course of employment, but the superior court reversed and
concluded that the deviation was significant.8"
The court of appeals discussed the several distinct categories
concerning the magnitude of deviations from employment.8 2 One is a
"slight deviation" which is so closely connected with the employer's
affairs that even though the employee may derive some benefit from it,
it may be regarded as arising out of and in the course of employment.8 3
Another group of cases hold that when employees conclude their
personal mission and resume the master's business before an injury
occurs, the injury is viewed as arising out of and in the course of

A.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

266 Ga. at 741, 470 S.E.2d at 866.67.
Id. at 741-42, 470 S.E.2d at 866-67.
Id. at 742, 470 S.E.2d at 867.
Id.
217 Ga. App. 534, 458 S.E.2d 173 (1995).

81. Id. at 534, 458 S.E.2d at 174.
82. Id. at 534-35, 458 S.E.2d at 174.
83. Id. at 534, 458 S.E.2d at 174. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Souther,
110 Ga. App. 84, 137 S.E.2d 705 (1964).
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employment.84 Because the categories are imprecisely defined, and
placing each fact pattern into each category is a factual determination
for the Board, the superior court erred in substituting its view on a
factual issue. 85
However, when a claimant sustains an injury while returning from a
substantial geographic deviation, the claimant is not entitled to benefits
because the accident does not arise out of and in the course of employFor example, in South Georgia Timber Co. v. Petty, 7 the
ment.8
claimant had a contract with South Georgia Timber to provide timber
cutting services. South Georgia Timber deducted an amount from each
check for workers' compensation coverage. On the date of the injury, the
claimant had driven to Waycross, approximately thirty-five miles away
from Folkston where South Georgia Timber is located, to meet with an
insurance agent about the possibility of procuring her own coverage.
The claimant took the agent to the job site and then drove the agent
back to Waycross. While in Waycross, the claimant stopped at a mall to
use the rest room and look for boots. Although she was planning to
return to Folkston to deliver a check to her contract hauler, she was
abducted by an armed assailant when she got back into her car. The
claimant suffered injuries .when she was thrown from her car."
The Board denied the claim, finding that the claimant was on a purely
personal trip to obtain insurance for her own company. Moreover, the
trip to the mall was a further deviation that placed her outside the scope
of her employment with South Georgia Timber. However, the superior
court relied on the claimant's testimony that she planned to return to
Folkston to pay her contract hauler and held that she had returned to
her duties for South Georgia Timber. 9 The court of appeals reversed,
agreeing with the Board's determination that the claimant deviated for
Additionally, she was not reasonably
purely personal reasons.'
expected to be at a Waycross shopping mall in the course of her
employment. She had not returned to her duties when the assault took
place because she was so far away from where she normally would have
been to deliver the check. 91

84.
Elzey,
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

217 Ga. App. at 534-35, 458 S.E.2d at 174. See, e.g., Fulton County Civil Court v.
101 Ga. App. 520, 523, 114 S.E.2d 314, 316 (1960).
217 Ga. App. at 535, 458 S.E.2d at 175.
See South Georgia Timber Co. v. Petty, 218 Ga. App. 497, 462 S.E.2d 176 (1995).
218 Ga. App. 497, 462 S.E.2d 176 (1995).
Id. at 497, 462 S.E.2d at 177.
Id. at 497-98, 462 S.E.2d at 177.
Id. at 499, 462 S.E.2d at 178.

91. Id., 462 S.E.2d at 178-79.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

1996]

595

As a general rule, injuries from idiopathic falls on the job are not
covered under the Act because they do not arise out of employment,
although they occur in the course of employment.92 Under a narrow
exception, when a claimant strikes some object specifically related to the
work place, in the process of an idiopathic fall, such as a workbench,
machinery, or equipment, the injuries are compensable because of the
"increased risk" caused by the presence of the work-related object.9" In
PrudentialBank v. Moore,94 a computer clerk struck her head on a floor
baseboard when she fainted at work and claimed to suffer headaches,
neck pain, carpal tunnel syndrome, and diplopia (double vision) as a
result of the fall. The Board denied benefits, finding that the fall did not
arise out of and in the course of employment. 5 The superior court
reversed. 6
The court of appeals held that to contrast hitting one's head on a floor
baseboard, as opposed to hitting the floor directly, makes a distinction
without a difference because a baseboard is a structural hazard that the
claimant is equally exposed to apart from her employment.97 Because
neither a wall nor a baseboard are peculiar to the employment, and
therefore do not fit within the exception to noncoverage, the accident did
not arise out of and in the course of employment.98
Although the Act reaches employees whose injuries are the result of
an aggravation of a pre-existing condition," the aggravation must arise
out of and in the course of employment. 0 0 There is no liability for a
disability resulting from a new accident unrelated to the claimant's
employment.''
For example, in Shuman v. Engineered Fabrics,'0 2
the claimant herniated a disc in her neck in 1991 during the course of
her employment as a parachute sewer. The employer accepted the
injury as compensable and voluntarily commenced payment of benefits.
In 1992, the claimant injured her lower back when her legs gave way
92. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (Supp. 1996). See also Wood v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
116 Ga. App. 284, 157 S.E.2d 60 (1967); Borden Foods Co. v. Dorsey, 112 Ga. App. 838, 146
S.E.2d 532 (1965).
93. See, e.g., United States Casualty Co. v. Richardson, 75 Ga. App. 496, 499, 43
S.E.2d 793, 795 (1947).
94. 219 Ga. App. 847, 467 S.E.2d 7 (1996).

95. Id. at 847,467 S.E.2d at 8. See Borden Foods Co. v. Dorsey, 112 Ga. App. 838, 146
S.E.2d 532 (1965).

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

219 Ga. App. at 847, 467 S.E.2d at 8.
Id. at 848, 467 S.E.2d at 9.
Id.
See O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (Supp. 1996).
Id.
Id.
220 Ga. App. 636, 469 S.E.2d 847 (1996).
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while squatting down to pick up an eggshell off her kitchen floor. The
back injury subsequently required surgery. The AiU determined that
the injury was compensable, finding that the claimant's employment
aggravated her pre-existing degenerative disc disease. However, the
Appellate Division of the Board reversed, finding that the claimant
sustained a specific "at home" accident and that degenerative disc
disease alone is not a compensable injury in the absence of an employment-related event which aggravates the underlying condition. The
superior court and court of appeals affirmed the Appellate Division. 03'
Similarly, in Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Hallisey,'°4 the claimant
injured his back when he slipped, but did not seek medical treatment.
He worked the remainder of his shift that day and his entire shift the
following day. Three days after the injury, he played golf. After teeing
off on the twenty-fourth hole, his back pain became so severe he had to
discontinue the game. The next day, the claimant reported that he
would not be coming to work because he injured his back playing golf.
The orthopedic surgeon who treated him testified that the golf game
aggravated his work injury.'0 5 The Board awarded indemnity and
medical benefits, finding that the golf outing did not cause the disabling
injury but "temporarily aggravated and accelerated the symptoms from
the injury."106 The court of appeals reversed." 7
The court held that benefits are not properly awarded when an
aggravation of the injury is due to the claimant's own negligent conduct
outside the workplace, even though the initial injury was workrelated.0 " The court distinguished Terry v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co.,"° which held that an employee's negligence in sustaining a workrelated injury is not a bar to compensation." 0 Instead, the court noted
that an employee's conduct in negligently aggravating a work-related
injury outside of the workplace may be a bar."' As a general rule,
every normal consequence that flows from the initial work-related injury
also arises out of employment, but the employee is not relieved of all
responsibility for subsequent conduct relating to the cause of the
injury." 2 If the claimant knows of the injury and nevertheless partici-

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 636-37, 469 S.E.2d at 848.
221 Ga. App. 325, 471 S.E.2d 231 (1996), cert. granted (Oct. 31, 1996).
Id. at 326, 471 S.E.2d at 232.
Id.
Id. at 327, 471 S.E.2d at 233.
Id.
152 Ga. App. 583, 263 S.E.2d 475 (1979).
Id. at 584, 263 S.E.2d at 476.
221 Ga. App. at 326, 471 S.E.2d at 232-33.
Id. at 327, 471 S.E.2d at 233.
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pates in activities likely to produce a harmful result, the chain of
causation
is broken by the claimant's own negligence as a matter of
3
law.1
B. Appeals
In Clinical Arts Home Care Services v. Smith, 4 the court of appeals
considered a ruling from the Appellate Division which made reference
to a de novo review of the record, but which was rendered subsequent to
the adoption of a new standard for appeals. The AIJ found that the
employee had suffered a new injury. The decision was appealed, and on
August 30, 1994, the Appellate Division issued its award reversing the
A_." 5 In doing so, the Appellate Division stated that it had conducted a de novo consideration of the evidence, which the court of appeals
ruled was error. A new standard of review, preponderance of competent
and credible evidence, had gone into effect two months before the
Appellate Division's award was issued and, as such, that standard
should have been applied. 6
The case of Adivari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co." 7 is a prime example
of the risks pro se litigants face when handling their own workers'
compensation claims. Adivari was dissatisfied with the denial of
benefits by the Board and appealed the decision to the superior court
which, in turn, dismissed for failure to comply with O.C.G.A. section 349-105.1"8 Dissatisfied with this decision, Adivari mistakenly filed an
"Application for Appeal" with the superior court clerk's office. An appeal
in a workers' compensation matter beyond the superior court level is
discretionary in nature and must be filed directly with the court of
appeals."' Adivari's procedural error was costly.
C.

Attorney Fees

While it might be reasonable to dispute a claim at the ALJ level, an
appeal may be viewed as unreasonable even though the Appellate

113. Id.
114. 218 Ga. App. 681, 462 S.E.2d 757 (1995).
115. Id. at 681-82, 462 S.E.2d at 759.
116. Id. at 682,462 S.E.2d at 759; see also TruckStops of America, Inc. v. Engram, 220
Ga. App. 289, 469 S.E.2d 425 (1996).
117.

221 Ga. App. 279, 471 S.E.2d 59 (1996).

118. Id. at 279, 471 S.E.2d at 59. Appellate procedure at the superior court level can
be problematic for attorneys, much less pro se litigants. See, e.g., Buschel v. Kysor/Warren,
213 Ga. App. 91, 444 S.E.2d 105 (1994); Borden, Inc. v. Holland, 212 Ga. App. 820, 442
S.E.2d 916 (1994).
119. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(aXl) (1995).
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Division has the authority to reconsider the facts. In Richardson v. Air
Products & Chemicals, Inc., 2 ° the employer denied liability for the
employee's chronic prostatitis, which the employee blamed on his job
duties as a truck driver. The AIJ found for Richardson based on a
medical opinion, and the employer appealed, arguing that chronic
prostatitis did not meet the definition of a compensable injury. Noting
that it was a well established principle that an aggravation of a preexisting condition is compensable under Georgia law, the Appellate
Division assessed attorney fees for what it deemed an unreasonable
appeal. The superior court reversed, but was in turn reversed by the
court of appeals, which held that there was evidence in the record
supporting the finding that Air Products appealed without reasonable
grounds. 2 ' The case was remanded to the superior court for a determination of whether that appeal was subject to an assessment of fees as
well.' 22
A different result was reached in Pet, Inc. v. Ward." 3 There, the
court of appeals held that the AIJ "completely ignored the evidence
supporting" the employer's defense. 24 Although the evidence may
have allowed an award of compensation, it was not demanded, and the
employer's defense in the matter was reasonable. 25 As noted by the
court of appeals, the Board "must prove by the record" that there is, in
fact, evidence of unreasonableness in order to warrant
an assessment of
126
attorney fees under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-108(b)(1).
D. Change in Condition
The Georgia Supreme Court issued a significant decision during this
survey period resolving an issue that has sharply divided the workers'
compensation community in recent years-What is a claimant's burden
of proof to show a change in condition? 127 In Maloney v. Gordon
County Farms," the court overruled two court of appeals cases'2

120. 217 Ga. App. 663, 458 S.E.2d 694 (1995).
121. Id. at 665, 458 S.E.2d at 696.
122. Id. at 666, 458 S.E.2d at 696.
123. 219 Ga. App. 525, 466 S.E.2d 46 (1995).
124. Id. at 526, 466 S.E.2d at 48.
125. Id. at 527, 466 S.E.2d at 48.
126. Id. at 526, 466 S.E.2d at 48.
127. For a general discussion of the burden of proof debate, see Bagley et al., supra note
2, at 502-510.
128. 265 Ga. 825, 462 S.E.2d 606 (1995).
129. Aden's Minit Market v. Landon, 202 Ga. App. 219,413 S.E.2d 738 (1991); Autolite
v. Glaze, 211 Ga. App. 780,440 S.E.2d 497 (1994), overruledby Maloney v. Gordon County
Farms, 265 Ga. 825, 462 S.E.2d 606 (1995).
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which had established a more difficult (some argued impossible) burden
of proof for employees attempting to prove a change in condition.
In Maloney, the claimant sustained a compensable injury and returned
to light-duty work, but was subsequently terminated for a cause
unrelated to her disability. Following unsuccessful attempts to obtain
other suitable employment, she requested a hearing before the Board
seeking the reinstatement of temporary total disability benefits on the
grounds that her unsuccessful efforts to find suitable employment
resulted in an economic change in condition. The claimant presented
evidence that she had applied for, and was offered, a job with Burger
King, but the offer was withdrawn when she informed the prospective
employer that she was receiving benefits and was unable to perform
strenuous duties. The claimant also testified that she disclosed her
physical limitations on applications with five other employers and
received no job offers. The AIU reinstated benefits, and this decision
was adopted by both the Appellate Division and the superior court. 3 '
However, the court of appeals reversed, holding that the claimant's
testimony regarding her failure to obtain employment was inadmissible
hearsay, and therefore, the claimant failed to meet her burden of proof
under the Aden's Minit Market standard.13 '
The supreme court reversed, holding that in order to receive workers'
compensation benefits based upon a change in condition, a claimant
must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) she suffered
a loss of earning power as a result of a compensable work-related injury;
(2) she continues to suffer physical limitations attributable to that
injury; and (3) she has made a diligent, but unsuccessful effort to secure
suitable employment following termination. 3 2 Once evidence is offered
to establish the foregoing elements, the Board may draw reasonable
inferences that, despite the claimant's good faith efforts, her inability to
find suitable employment was proximately caused by the continuing
disability.133 In particular, the supreme court overruled the requirements of Aden's Minit Market and other cases" that required a
claimant not only to show an inability to obtain suitable employment,
but also why the employment was refused.'35 The supreme court

130. 265 Ga. at 825-26, 462 S.E.2d at 607.
131. Id.

132. Id. at 828, 462 S.E.2d at 608-09.
133. Id.
134. See 202 Ga. App. 219, 413 S.E.2d 738 (1991), overruled by Maloney v. Gordon

County Farms, 265 Ga. 825, 462 S.E.2d 606 (1995); Evco Plastics v. Burton, 211 Ga. App.
121, 407 S.E.2d 60 (1991).
136. 265 Ga. at 828, 462 S.E.2d at 609.
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agreed that requiring a claimant to essentially prove an employer's
motive and state of mind in refusing employment is too difficult a
burden to impose.
A number of cases decided subsequent to Maloney during this survey
period focused on what constitutes a "diligent but unsuccessful" search
for suitable employment. For example, in Sadeghi v. Suad, Inc., 37 the
claimant testified that he was unable to find suitable employment after
looking for light-duty work at over one hundred places."s Although
the Board denied benefits, the court of appeals reversed based upon the
supreme court's decision in Maloney, and remanded the case for a
determination under the new burden of proof"3 9 Likewise, in Harrell
v. Albany Police Department,"4 the Appellate Division reversed the
Ai's determination that the claimant had made a sincere but unsuccessful attempt to return to work. The claimant had returned to work
from a compensable injury, but was fired from his position as a
corrections officer when he was caught sleeping on the job.'
Although the court of appeals found that the Appellate Division applied
the erroneous Aden's standard, it upheld the Appellate Division's
authority to make a separate determination regarding whether the
claimant's effort to obtain suitable employment was diligent, and
remanded the case for a ruling under the Maloney burden of proof.'
In L.C.R Chemicals v. Strickland,43 the claimant sustained a
compensable injury and returned to work for approximately one week,
only to lose his job when the plant at which he was employed closed. In
support of his claim for additional disability benefits, the claimant
presented a record of work search listing a variety of inquiries he made
following the closing of the plant. The claimant also testified as to
several verbal inquiries that he made. The employer presented evidence,
however, that while he was out of work, the claimant began campaigning
for a position as county commissioner, raising ten to twelve thousand
dollars, helped his girlfriend manage a trailer park, collected money for
her and arranged repairs when needed, and was also a member of two
bowling leagues, bowling two nights a week.'" The court of appeals
found that the evidence supported the AI's findings that the claimant

136.
137.
138,
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
219 Ga. App. 92, 464 S.E.2d 234 (1995).
Id. at 93, 464 S.E.2d at 235.
Id.
219 Ga. App. 810, 466 S.E.2d 682 (1996).
Id. at 810, 466 S.E.2d at 683.
Id. at 811-12, 466 S.E.2d at 683-84.
221 Ga. App. 742, 472 S.E.2d 471 (1996).
Id. at 742-43, 472 S.E.2d at 472-73.
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was "able to enjoy his recreational activities and run for public office"
and that he did not appear to be actively searching for employment at
the time of the hearing." The court also found that the mere fact the
previous employer might not have been able to offer the claimant lightduty work did not relieve the claimant of proving that he made an
otherwise diligent effort to obtain employment elsewhere.'" To date,
the cases interpreting Maloney demonstrate that the Board has broad
discretion in determining whether a "diligent"job search has been made
in any given case.
Several other cases during this survey period dealt with the subject of
change in condition, although none were as significant as the Maloney
decision.

In Pate v. Eastern Airlines,"" the claimant sustained a

compensable injury while working as a baggage handler for Eastern
Airlines. At the same time, the claimant was also operating a landscaping business. The income from the landscaping business was not
included in the calculation of the claimant's disability benefits, and the
claimant continued to perform essentially supervisory tasks in the
landscaping job after his accident." Although the employer contended
that the claimant's continued work for the landscaping business
constituted a change in condition, the court of appeals held that because
the claimant's employment was "concurrent dissimilar employment,"'49
the wages claimant earned in the landscaping business could not be
considered in determining whether the claimant had undergone a change
in condition."0 The court reasoned that because the claimant's wages
with the landscaping business were not calculated as a part of the
claimant's average weekly wage, they could not be used against him to
determine a suspension of benefits.' 5 ' This holding seems unusual
given the well-documented principle that the claimant bears the burden
of demonstrating a change in condition when he has returned to work
following a compensable injury."5 Presumably, the focus should have
been on whether the claimant's work in the landscaping business
constituted a true return to work. Apparently, the court was impressed
by the fact that the claimant's duties with the landscaping business were
very light in nature, and that the physical limitations from his
145. Id. at 744, 472 S.E.2d at 473.
146. Id., 459 S.E.2d at 474.
147. 218 Ga. App. 451, 462 SE.2d 153 (1995).
148. Id. at 451, 462 S.E.2d at 154.
149. Id. at 452, 462 S.E.2d at 154.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Cornell-Young (Macon Pre-Stressed Concrete Co.) v. Minter, 168 Ga. App. 325, 309
S.E.2d 159 (1983).
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compensable injury prevented his return to work to his job as a baggage
handler.
In Chem Lawn Services v. Stephens,153 the court distinguished
between an employer's burden of proof to show a change in condition and
the law regarding an aggravation of a pre-existing condition. Stephens
injured his left knee at work, received workers' compensation medical
and disability benefits, subsequently returned to work, and was later
terminated. The medical evidence presented at the hearing demonstrated that the claimant suffered from a pre-existing disease in both knees
known as osteochondritis dissecans ("OD") that developed over a long
period prior to the accident. The blow to the knee sustained at work
temporarily aggravated the claimant's pre-existing condition, but the
aggravation was resolved prior to the claimant's return to normal-duty
work. The employer alleged that subsequent knee problems were caused
by a progressive worsening of the claimant's pre-existing condition,
rather than by the compensable injury. The A.J characterized the issue
as a change in condition and held that since the employer accepted the
case as compensable, it was now prohibited from contending that the
claimant's pre-existing OD condition was not work-related.'
The
court of appeals reversed, holding that a pre-existing condition which is
aggravated by an on-the-job injury ceases to be compensable when the
aggravation is no longer the cause of the disability.5 '
A similar issue was presented in Continental Grain Co. v. Thomas.156 Thomas was injured in 1989 when she inhaled phosphine gas.
The employer voluntarily accepted the claim as compensable and
commenced payment of disability benefits for both physical and
psychological injuries resulting from the accident. The following year,
the employer requested a hearing to suspend benefits based upon a
change in condition for the better. Both the AIU and the Appellate
Division held that the claimant's medical and psychological benefits
should be terminated. However, the superior court reversed, finding
that the claimant suffered solely a psychological injury and that the
employer was estopped from controverting any further benefits because
it failed to do so within sixty days of the date benefits were originally
due, as required by O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221(h).' 57 The court of
appeals reversed, finding that the employer was simply attempting to

153. 220 Ga. App. 239, 469 S.E.2d 375 (1996).
154. Id. at 240-41, 469 S.E.2d at 377.
155. Id. at 243,469 S.E.2d at 378-79. See O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (Supp. 1996); Leatherby

Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 142 Ga. App. 476, 236 S.E.2d 168 (1977).
156. 218 Ga. App. 240, 459 S.E.2d 623 (1995).
157. Id. at 241, 459 S.E.2d at 624.
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demonstrate a change in the claimant's physical and psychological
The court
status, and was not controverting the case as a whole.'
also found that there was no evidence in the record that the claimant
suffered solely a psychological injury. Furthermore, the employer
presented deposition testimony of two doctors who concluded that the
claimant was able to return to work from both a physical and psychological perspective. 5 9 The court determined that there was sufficient
evidence to support the Board's determination that benefits should be
suspended, and therefore reinstated this decision."6°
E.

Change of Physician

The court of appeals had two opportunities to address the 1994
amendments to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-201 during this survey period.'6 1
In Porter v. Ingles Market, Inc.,'6 2 the claimant suffered injuries to her
neck and back. The employer initially accepted the claim as compensable, but subsequently objected to treatment by a psychiatrist. The
claimant's approved treating physician referred her to the psychiatrist;
however, she did not seek a change of physician under O.C.G.A. section
34-9-201(d).' 63 The AUJ determined that the psychiatric treatment
was unauthorized, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding that the
employer was responsible for the bills because it did not have a posted
panel of physicians. The superior court affirmed a portion of the Board's
decision, but remanded the case for the treating physicians to consider
additional
medical records indicating that the claimant suffered a prior
injury.164 The court of appeals held that at the time the Board issued
its decision, the claimant was required to petition the Board for a change
of physician because the employer was providing medical care when the
However, the 1994
claimant began the psychiatric treatments.'65
amendments to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-201(b)(1), which are applied
retroactively, allow the authorized treating physician to arrange any
referral without prior Board approval.'6

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 242, 459 S.E,2d at 625.
161. See Porter v. Ingles Market, Inc., 219 Ga. App. 145,464 S.E.2d 212 (1995); Barnes
v. City of Atlanta Police Dep't, 219 Ga. App. 139, 464 S.E.2d 609 (1995).
162. 219 Ga. App. 145, 464 S.E.2d 212 (1995).
163. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-201(d) (Supp. 1996).
164. 219 Ga. App. at 146, 464 S.E.2d at 213-14.
165. Id, 464 S.E.2d at 213.
166. Id.
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Similarly, in Barnes v. City of Atlanta Police Department,'67 the City
initially controverted the compensability of the claim, but subsequently
accepted the claim as compensable and only controverted payment for
unauthorized medical treatment. The City claimed that medical
treatment given pursuant to referrals was unauthorized under O.C.G.A.
sections 34-9-200 and 34-9-201, which required Board approval for a
change of physician or treatment. The Board held that the claimant was
not required to seek Board approval for a change in physician or
treatment because the City had initially controverted the compensability
of the claim."6 The superior court reversed and remanded.'6 9
The court of appeals held that because the City had accepted the claim
as compensable and was providing medical benefits at the time the
referrals were made, the reasoning of CapitalAtlanta, Inc. v. Carroll7
did not apply.'71 Although the amended version of O.C.G.A. section
34-9-201 no longer requires Board approval for referrals made by the
primary authorized treating physician, an unlimited chain of referrals
is not allowed. 7 2 Other medical practitioners to whom the claimant
is referred are not allowed to arrange for additional referrals.17
Further, because the 1994 amendments to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-201 deal
with the scope of the remedy and not with the compensability of the
claim, the 1994 amendments are remedial and are properly applied
174
retroactively.
What about when an employer controverts only a portion of the claim?
Can an employee then simply choose her own doctor without seeking
approval from the Board? The answer is no. In GeorgiaBaptist Medical
Center v. Moore, 75 the employer did not fully controvert the claim so
as to entitle the claimant to seek treatment from a nonpanel physician.
Rather, the employer accepted the claim as compensable, provided
medical treatment by panel physicians, and only sought to controvert

167. 219 Ga. App. 139, 464 S.E.2d 609 (1995).
168. Id. at 140,464 S.E.2d at 610-11. See Capital Atlanta, Inc. v. Carroll, 213 Ga. App.
214, 444 S.E.2d 592 (1994).
169. 219 Ga. App. at 140, 464 S.E.2d at 610.
170. 213 Ga. App. 214, 444 S.E.2d 592 (1994).
171. 219 Ga. App. at 140, 464 S.E.2d at 611.
172. Id. at 141, 464 S.E.2d at 611.

173. Id.
174. Id. See also Arrow Co. v. Smith, 221 Ga. App 536, 472 S.E.2d 332 (1996). The
Georgia Supreme Court had granted certiorari and remanded the case to the court of
appeals for reconsideration in light of Porterv. Ingles Market, 219 Ga. App. 145,464 S.E.2d
212 (1995) and Barnes v. City of Atlanta Police Dep't, 219 Ga. App. 139, 464 S.E.2d 609
(1995).
175. 219 Ga. App. 171, 464 S.E.2d 265 (1995).
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treatment by an unauthorized chiropractor."" Under these circumstances, the court held, the claimant must petition the Board for
approval under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-200(b) before seeking treatment. 17 7 However, the court affirmed the Board's finding that the
claimant was entitled to disability benefits, holding that although the
treating
chiropractor's records were not provided by an authorized
17
1
admissible.
and
competent
was
evidence
such
physician,
F

Coverage
As seen in Underwood v. Dunn,"9 failure to carry workers' compensation insurance can be costly. Mary Dunn, an employee of Prewett
Industries, was injured on the job. After filing a claim for benefits, she
not only discovered that her employer failed to have workers' compensation insurance, but that it was insolvent as well. After obtaining an
award of benefits against her employer from the Board, she filed suit
against two corporate officers for the amount she should have recovered
in workers' compensation benefits on the grounds that they breached
their statutorily imposed duty of maintaining workers' compensation
insurance coverage." ° Dunn prevailed against the corporate officers
personally, and an appeal was taken.'8 1 The court of appeals upheld
the judgment, holding that Dunn successfully established the necessary
elements of her cause of action, which were: (1) a valid workers'
compensation claim; (2) a valid Board award; and (3) the employer's
insolvency.8 2 As noted by the court, the proper measure of damages
is the amount equal to the workers' compensation award, which, in this
case, included some stiff penalties. 183
G.

Heart Attacks/Strokes
Perhaps one of the most controversial decisions to be issued during the
recent survey period was Reynolds Construction Co. v. Reynolds.'
This case provided a focal point for the recent debate over the seeming

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 171-72, 464 S.E.2d at 266-67.
Id. at 172, 464 S.E.2d at 266.
Id. at 172-73, 464 S.E.2d at 267.
221 Ga. App. 185, 470 S.E.2d 781 (1996).
Id. at 185-86, 470 S.E.2d at 781.
Id. at 186, 470 S.E.2d at 781.
Id., 470 S.E.2d at 782.
Id.
218 Ga. App. 23, 459 S.E.2d 612 (1995).
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expansion of compensability in cases dealing with heart attacks and
strokes.'8 5

Reynolds was a thirty-seven-year-old man who worked for a familyowned construction business. He suffered a disabling stroke allegedly
caused by work-related mental worry and fatigue over a three-year
period. The claimant alleged that his fatigue and stress resulted from
his company's ninety percent decrease in gross sales, creditors repossessing the company's equipment, cancellation of company insurance policies
for nonpayment of premium, and the company's firing of nearly thirty
employees. The claimant also testified that he personally guaranteed
many of the company's debts, was being pursued by numerous creditors,
and would often work fifteen hours a day, seven days a week, when jobs
were available. Although both the claimant and his brother testified to
the extreme nature of the claimant's work-related fatigue and stress, the
claimant presented no medical evidence whatsoever to link this condition
with his eventual stroke. However, the employer introduced medical
evidence from the claimant's treating physician stating that the
claimant's stroke was not directly attributable to any work-related
activity, but was rather the result of arteriosclerosis.1s6 The ALJ
applied the so-called "heart attack statute" contained in O.C.G.A. section
34-9-1(4), in analyzing the claimant's heart attack claim. Through the
"natural inference of human experience," the AUJ found that the
claimant's stroke was work-related." 7 According to the supreme court,
the Board may use the "natural inference rule" to determine whether a
heart attack claim is compensable based on three sources of evidence:
medical evidence, lay evidence, and the "natural inference through
human experience."'
Both the Appellate Division and the superior
court affirmed the ALJ's decision. 9 The court of appeals affirmed,
holding that the ALJ's "natural inference" did not disappear, and the
testimony of credible lay witnesses was not rendered meaningless simply
because medical evidence was offered that supported a different
conclusion."o
Interestingly, however, O.C.G.A. section 34-9-1(4) makes no specific
references to strokes, but rather deals solely with "heart disease, heart

185. See H. Michael Bagley, Daniel C. Kniffen & John G. Blackmon, Jr., Workers'
Compensation, 46 MERCER L. REV. 535, 566-68 (1994).
186. 218 Ga. App. at 24, 459 S.E.2d at 613.
187. Id.
188. See Guye v. Home Indem. Co., 241 Ga. 213, 244 S.E.2d 864 (1978); Hoffman v.
National Sur. Corp., 91 Ga. App. 414, 85 S.E.2d 784 (1955). See generally Bagley et al.,
supra note 72, at 405, 415-420.
189. 218 Ga. App. at 23, 459 S.E.2d at 613.
190. Id. at 25-26, 459 S.E.2d at 614.
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attack, the failure or occlusion of any of the coronary blood vessels or
thrombosis."' 9' On its face, the statute does not appear to apply in
cases of stroke, which is a cerebrovascular condition as opposed to a
coronary condition.' 92 Nevertheless, the court focused on the "natural
inference rule" that has developed from the interpretation of the heart
attack statute, and concluded that the AJ was not bound to accept
what the court described as a cursory medical opinion and thereby
ignore the testimony of two credible lay witnesses. 9 "
As noted previously in this Article, the General Assembly specifically
amended O.C.G.A. section 34-9-1(4), effective July 1, 1996, to both
specifically include strokes in the heart attack statute and to require, as
a precondition to recovery, evidence from a physician that the condition
at issue is "related to the work of employment at the time the condition
This amendment reflects the concern raised by the
occurred."194
Reynolds decision's disregard of uncontradicted medical evidence in the
face of lay testimony on the complex issue of whether a stroke is causally
related to the amorphous concepts of chronic stress and fatigue. In all
future cases relating to heart attacks and strokes, the employee will
have to produce at least some medical evidence that demonstrates a
causal relationship between the claimant's employment and the
condition.
The court of appeals reversed an award of benefits based upon a fatal
heart attack in Kines v. City of Rome.'95 Kines, a twenty-two year
veteran police officer, suffered a heart attack and died at home
approximately thirty-six hours after his last work shift. Seeking
workers' compensation death benefits, the decedent's widow presented
the expert testimony of two doctors who had never treated the decendent, but who testified that the decedent's stress from his job was a
significant factor in bringing on his heart attack. Relying on this
testimony, the ALJ found that the decedent's heart attack was workrelated and awarded benefits." 9 The court of appeals reversed, finding
that the hypothetical questions to which the expert witnesses responded
were deficient because they did not disclose that the deceased's mother's

191. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (Supp. 1996).
192. Underscoring this point, the General Assembly amended O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) in
reaction to Reynolds to specifically include the term "stroke" in the heart attack statute
contained in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (Supp. 1996). See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying
text.
193. 218 Ga. App. at 25-26, 459 S.E.2d at 614.
194. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (Supp. 1996).
195. 220 Ga. App. 732, 470 S.E.2d 311 (1996).
196. Id. at 733, 470 S.E.2d at 312.
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family had a significant history of heart disease.1" The court believed
that the facts omitted from the hypothetical questions resulted in
misleading testimony, and therefore, the testimony provided by the
experts was neither competent nor credible.19 Conversely, the court
found evidence that the deceased had been involved in a four-year
meretricious relationship and that his wife was pregnant at the time of
his death. The court concluded these facts would cause more stress than
a job the deceased had performed for twenty-two years without physical
problems.'
Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the superior court's
reversal of the benefits award.2°°
H.

Newly Discovered Evidence
If Distribution Concepts Co. v. Hunt"1 stands for anything, it is that
information discovered after the evidentiary hearing must meet certain
standards before it can be considered. °2 While appealing his denial
of benefits to the Appellate Division, Hunt filed a motion to remand for
newly discovered evidence claiming that within ten days of the adverse
award from the AIU, he located a former coworker who reportedly would
support his claim. The Appellate Division denied the motion and
affirmed the denial of benefits. The superior court reversed, directing
that the case be remanded to the AU for the taking of testimony from
the witness. 203 The court of appeals found this to be error and reversed.20 4 The testimony of the purported witness was cumulative,
meaning it could not qualify as newly discovered evidence. 2° The
superior court is "without any authority to remand the case on account
of newly discovered evidence," particularly when it goes to the
weight. 20 ' The Appellate Division's refusal to remand in such a case
20 7
will not be disturbed unless it has manifestly abused its authority.

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 734, 470 S.E.2d at 312.
Id., 470 S.E.2d at 312-13.
221 Ga. App. 449, 471 S.E.2d 539 (1996).

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 451, 471 S.E.2d at 541.
at 449-50, 471 S.E.2d at 540-41.
at 449, 471 S.E.2d at 540.
at 451, 471 S.E.2d at 541.
at 450, 471 S.E.2d at 541.
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PermanentPartialDisability
As the employee discovered in Metro Interiors, Inc. v.Cox,2 °' apportionment of a pre-existing condition can be problematic when requesting
benefits under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-263.2" Cox suffered hearing loss
as a result of a fall in 1990. When treated for the condition, he told the
otolaryngologist that he had suffered "slight" hearing loss before the
accident. However, he had never been tested beforehand. Thus,
although the Board found that the fall aggravated his hearing loss, it
was unable to determine the extent of the aggravation. As a result,
permanent partial disability ("PPD") benefits were denied. The superior
court reversed and remanded for a determination of any PPD benefits
which might be due.21 ° According to the court of appeals, this was
error.211 Although apportionment was allowable, the burden of proof
was on the employee to show the amount due. 2 " Not only had Cox
been unable to establish the degree of his pre-injury hearing loss, but
the ALJ also found that he was impeached when he tried to deny his
pre-existing hearing loss at the hearing. Because the denial of benefits
was based on evidence in the record, the Board's decision should have
been affirmed by the superior court.2 1
L

J.

Procedure
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-103 allows the Appellate Division to "reconsider,
amend, or revise the award to correct apparent errors and omissions .214 In Gibson v. Lindale Manufacturing Co.,215 the employee
sought reconsideration of the Appellate Division's award affirming the
denial of benefits. Relying on Asplundh Tee Expert Co. v. Gibson,21 6
the Appellate Division agreed and reversed itself, awarding benefits to
Gibson. 2 7 Lindale thereafter argued that "the entry of the additional
findings of fact on reconsideration represented an unlawful de novo
review of the compensability issue."2 The court of appeals disagreed,

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

218 Ga. App. 396, 461 S.E.2d 570 (1995).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-263 (1992).
218 Ga. App. at 396-97, 461 S.E.2d at 570-71.
Id. at 399, 461 S.E.2d at 572.
Id. at 398, 461 S.E.2d at 571-72.
Id at 398-99, 461 S.E.2d at 572.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-103(b) (Supp. 1996).

215. 218 Ga. App. 163, 460 S.E.2d 543 (1995).
216. 204 Ga. App. 853, 420 S.E.2d 797 (1992).
217. 218 Ga. App. at 163, 460 S.E.2d at 544.

218. Id. at 164, 460 S.E.2d at 544.
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noting that the Appellate Division did not conduct a new hearing, and
"confined its reconsideration to the existing record and certain facts it
erroneously omitted in its initial consideration of Gibson's claim."219
The Appellate Division was within its authority by issuing a revised
award that complied, "legally and factually, with the previously
considered record."22 The case was remanded to the superior court for
review of the Board's award on the merits of the case.22'
K. Statute of Limitations
In Atlantic ContainerServices v. Godbee, 2 the court of appeals was
faced with the issue of whether payment of longshore benefits tolled the
statute of limitations on an employee's workers' compensation claim.
Noting that a claim is timely if:
filed within one year after injury, except that if payment of weekly
benefits has been made or remedial treatment has been furnished by
the employer on account of the injury the claim may be filed within one
year after the date of the last remedial treatment furnished by the
two years after the date of the last payment of
employer or within
2
weekly benefits,

1

the court held that payment of longshore benefits would toll the statute
of limitations. 224 Even though longshore benefits were furnished by a
different carrier, the employer provided both "income benefits and
Thus, the
remedial medical treatment for the earlier injury." "
employee's claim was not time barred as to the first of two injuries even
though it had been filed more than one year after the accident.228
Subrogation
In Rowland v. Department of Administrative Services,227 the State
Department of Administrative Services ("DOAS") paid workers'
L.

219.

Id.

220. Id., 460 S.E.2d at 545.
221. Id.
222. 218 Ga. App. 594, 462 S.E.2d 465 (1995).
223. Id. at 595, 462 S.E.2d at 467 (citing O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82(a) (1992)).
224. Id.
225. Id. Godbee filed his claim on June 1, 1993 for accidents occurring on April 13,
1992 and August 31, 1992. The filing was obviously timely for the second accident, but the
AJ.J denied benefits on the grounds that the Longshore Act provided the exclusive remedy.
The superior court reversed this finding and was upheld by the court of appeals on the
grounds that there is concurrent jurisdiction. Id. at 594, 462 S.E.2d at 466. See also
AllSouth Stevedoring Co. v. Wilson, 220 Ga. App. 205, 469 S.E.2d 348 (1996).
226. 218 Ga. App. at 595, 462 S.E.2d at 467.
227. 219 Ga. App. 899, 466 S.E.2d 923 (1996).
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compensation benefits to Young as the result of injuries Young sustained
in an automobile collision while in the course of his employment. The
accident was caused by Rowland's negligence. Unbeknownst to DOAS,
Young settled his personal injury claim against Rowland without suit.
Rowland did not know of Young's workers' compensation claim. DOAS
subsequently sued Rowland under the assignment provision of the
subrogation statute, O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1(b), summary judgment
was granted to DOAS, and Rowland appealed.2"
The court considered whether an employer has an independent cause
of action against a tortfeasor, when the employee settles a cause of
action against the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor has no knowledge of the
employee's workers' compensation claim or the employer's subrogation
lien. 2'
Under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1(b), an employer has a lien
against any tort recovery an employee receives; the statute does not
confer to the employer an independent cause of action against the
tortfeasor." ° Under the statute as it then read, only if the employee
failed to bring a tort action against the tortfeasor within a year was the
employee's right of action assigned to the employer.23' Since Young
extinguished his claim against Rowland via settlement, there was no
The court noted that if
right of action to be assigned to DOAS.' 2
Rowland knew of the existence of Young's workers' compensation claim
or the DOAS's assertion of a subrogation lien, the settlement would not
have defeated the DOAS's subrogation right. 3 However, as Rowland
had no actual knowledge of the lien, the court rejected DOAS's claim
that Rowland should be deemed to have constructive knowledge.23 4
The court observed that a driver involved in a collision does not
necessarily fall into the scope of the Act.2" 5 Even if he is covered by
the Act, he may not have been in the scope of his employment at the
time of the accident.23 Thus, it would be unjust to place constructive
knowledge on a tortfeasor of the existence of a potential workers'
compensation claim.237 The court concluded that the settlement did

228. Id. at 900, 466 S.E.2d at 925.

229. Id. at 901-02, 466 S.E.2d at 925-26.
230. See O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1(b) (Supp. 1996).
231. 219 Ga. App. at 900-01, 466 S.E.2d at 925.

232. Id. at 901, 466 S.E.2d at 925.
233. Id. at 902, 466 S.E.2d at 926.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 903, 466 S.E.2d at 926.

236. Id.
237. Id., 466 S.E.2d at 927.
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not extinguish the DOAS's lien against Young to the extent he received
more than full compensation for his injury.2"'
Although the subrogation statute is not clear as to whether employers
and insurers are required to file a motion to intervene,239 failure by a
trial court to grant such a motion may be reversible error. For example,
in Department of Administrative Services v. Brown,2' the plaintiff, a
county worker, was injured in the course of her employment in an
automobile collision with a tractor-trailer. As a result, DOAS paid the
plaintiff over one-hundred thousand dollars in workers' compensation
benefits. The plaintiff then commenced a negligence action against the
truck driver and other parties, and DOAS filed a motion to intervene,
which the trial court denied. " The court of appeals reversed, finding
that O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11.1 grants a workers' compensation insurer
the right to intervene in an action against a third-party tortfeasor
brought by an employee to whom the insurer had paid benefits.242
M. Subsequent Injury Trust Fund
Practitioners considering a settlement which may impact a claim for
2
reimbursement against the Subsequent Injury Trust Fund ("SITF") 4

should be aware that the appellate courts have strictly construed the
statutory requirements of placing the SITF on notice of any settlement.
In Altermatts Paintingv. Subsequent Injury Trust Fund,' the employer entered into an agreement with the SITF for reimbursement of its
employee's claim. Prior to the Board's approval of the reimbursement
agreement, the employer entered into a settlement agreement with the
employee which was submitted to the Board for approval on the same
day the Board approved the reimbursement agreement. The SITF
sought to rescind the reimbursement agreement because the employer
did not comply with O.C.G.A. section 34-9-363.1(b). The employer failed
to obtain the SITF's approval of the settlement agreement before
submitting that agreement to the Board. The AIJ declared the
reimbursement agreement null and void and ordered the employer to

238. Id.
239. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1 (Supp. 1996).

240. 219 Ga. App. 27, 464 S.E.2d 7 (1995).
241. Id. at 27-28, 464 S.E.2d at 8.

242. Id. at 28, 464 S.E.2d at 8-9.
243. The SITF is a governmental fund created by statute, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-350 to -367,
to allow employers and insurers to obtain reimbursement once amounts paid on a
compensable claim exceed the necessary thresholds, provided a subsequent injury merges
with a pre-existing injury or condition. See O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-351 & 34-9-360 (1992 & Supp.
1996).

244. 219 Ga. App. 357,464 S.E.2d 922(1995), affd, 266 Ga. 866,471 S.E.2d 877(1996).
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reimburse the SITF for any monies received under the agreement. The
Board and the superior court affirmed.245
The court of appeals held that when a reimbursement agreement
between an employer and the SITF has been submitted to, but not yet
approved by the Board, the employer must submit a settlement
agreement first to the SITF for approval instead of submitting the
stipulation directly to the Board. 2"
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-363.1
imposes a duty on the employer or insurer to notify the SITF adminis2 7
trator of proposed settlement agreements made with the employee. 4
This duty is required because the SITF is ultimately financially
responsible for payment of the settlement agreement.2 4 Therefore, the
SITF must be given an opportunity to adjust the reimbursement
agreement based on the settlement agreement before the settlement
agreement is submitted to the Board.249 Settlements must be submitted first to the SITF, even when the reimbursement agreement has not
yet been approved. °
VI.

CONCLUSION

As we suggested in last year's survey, the bulk of the challenges in
workers' compensation law come in the every day practice. In this year's
survey period, mediation has continued to provide prompt and economical resolutions for a variety of issues, obviating the need for evidentiary
hearings. In the next survey period, practitioners can expect clarification from the Georgia Supreme Court on what may be a case of first
impression, not only in Georgia but in the nation: Whether a major
defense for employers, the Rycroft defense, conflicts with the Americans
With Disabilities Act. We look forward to reporting on this and other
developments next year.

245.

219 Ga. App. at 358, 464 S.E.2d at 923.

246. Id.
247. See O.C.G.A. § 34-9-363.1 (1992).
248. 219 Ga. App. at 360, 464 S.E.2d at 924.
249. Id.
250. Id.

